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Abstract
Influential concepts in neuroscientific research cast the brain a predictive machine that revises its predictions when they are
violated by sensory input. This relates to the predictive coding account of perception, but also to learning. Learning from
prediction errors has been suggested for take place in the hippocampal memory system as well as in the basal ganglia. The
present fMRI study used an action-observation paradigm to investigate the contributions of the hippocampus, caudate
nucleus and midbrain dopaminergic system to different types of learning: learning in the absence of prediction errors,
learning from prediction errors, and responding to the accumulation of prediction errors in unpredictable stimulus
configurations. We conducted analyses of the regions of interests’ BOLD response towards these different types of learning,
implementing a bootstrapping procedure to correct for false positives. We found both, caudate nucleus and the
hippocampus to be activated by perceptual prediction errors. The hippocampal responses seemed to relate to the
associative mismatch between a stored representation and current sensory input. Moreover, its response was significantly
influenced by the average information, or Shannon entropy of the stimulus material. In accordance with earlier results, the
habenula was activated by perceptual prediction errors. Lastly, we found that the substantia nigra was activated by the
novelty of sensory input. In sum, we established that the midbrain dopaminergic system, the hippocampus, and the
caudate nucleus were to different degrees significantly involved in the three different types of learning: acquisition of new
information, learning from prediction errors and responding to unpredictable stimulus developments. We relate learning
from perceptual prediction errors to the concept of predictive coding and related information theoretic accounts.
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Introduction
The notion of the brain as a predictive machine pervades
contemporary neuroscientific concepts [1–6]. One great achieve-
ment of the approach is that it brings perception and learning into
proximity [7]. If the brain constantly predicts its sensory input [8–
9], it has to learn correct models of its environment to achieve
functional predictions [10]. This idea poses a powerful account of
cortical responses [11], especially in primary sensory cortices [9]
and the cortical motor network [12]. The contributions of
subcortical and allocortical components, however, may not have
received its due attention. The present study investigated how the
caudate nucleus and hippocampus may contribute to learning in a
predictive framework.
The update mechanisms of predictions are described in the
predictive coding account of perception [2,10,13,14]. This
account recasts the brain as a Bayesian inference machine [15].
Perception relies on probabilistic models at each level of cortical
hierarchy [8,9,11,16]. Each of these models predicts the proba-
bility of sensory activity at the level below [8,11,13,14], for the
most likely states of the environment. The model sends these
predictions of probable lower level activity via backward
projections to the level below [2,11]. If the sensory input at this
lower level matches the predictions, the signal is filtered [9,11,13]. If
the sensory input does not match the predictions, the difference is
signaled via forward connections to the next higher level [11]. This
difference is called the prediction error [8,11]. It could also be
described as the surprise at the sensory input [8,17–19], linking the
concept of predictive coding to information theoretic quantities.
The prediction errors cause an adjustment of the model at the
higherlevel.Thisadjustmentpertainstolearning,iftheprobabilities
encompassed in the model and thus its predictions are altered as a
result of the prediction errors [8], or if the internal model is replaced
by a model that delivers more functional predictions [20].
Perceptual inference can thus lead to learning [8,10]. What type
of learning occurs depends on the reliability of information. If
prediction errors accumulate, the environment is said to contain a
lot of entropy [8,18,19]. In psychological terms, entropy can be
translated to uncertainty [21]. Volatility, another measure of
uncertainty, has been shown to influence learning rate [22].
Neuroscientific research on learning has discussed the interplay
and competition of two learning systems [23–27]. One of these
systems relies on the striatum, while the other is understood to be
hippocampus-based. Both systems have been associated with
learning from violated predictions [28–31]. Moreover, both
systems receive projections from the midbrain dopaminergic
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 May 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 5 | e36445system which seems to be involved in both systems’ respective
learning mechanisms [28,31–33].
The hippocampal memory system is understood to be an
associative mismatch detector [29–34], which responds when the
predictions of stored representations are violated by events that
were previously not associated with the stored representation
[24,35]. In clear terms this means that the hippocampus is
activated more by events that relate to a known representation but
differ in some regard from what has been learnt (associative
mismatch) than by completely novel events [29]. The hippocam-
pus and its underlying dopaminergic projections have been
proposed to enable sequential learning [33,35–37] and to code
for violations of sequences [29,38]. Lastly, new results have
suggested that hippocampal activity increase is not dependent on
novelty or violated predictions per se, but to uncertainty [18]. This
would mean that hippocampal activity signifies the learning that
oddballs can occur.
The striatum and its underlying dopaminergic projections have
famously been associated with prediction errors in the context of
reward-related learning [30,31], a finding that has been replicated
in humans [39,40]. Moreover, recent imaging studies suggest that
perceptual prediction errors, i.e. violated expectations unrelated to
reward, also activate the striatum [41–43].
The current study aimed to dissociate the contributions of the
hippocampal and striatal systems to different types of learning that
are marked to different degrees by novelty and prediction errors.
We presented subjects with videos of everyday actions that were
either entirely new to the participant, were related to a known
movie but then repeatedly shown in a different version, or were
related to a known movie and but then repeatedly shown in
different versions (Figure 1). The first type of learning that was
investigated was the acquisition of new representations (we will call
these representations internal models). The internal models
encompassed actions and were learned through repeated exposi-
tion of the action movies (new originals, hereafter). The according
activity change basically pertains to the adaptation of novelty
responses, signified by an attenuation of the BOLD response. The
second type of learning we investigated was the adaptation of
Figure 1. Examples for the experimental conditions of interest (Singletons, New Originals, Divergents, and Unpredictables), and their
respective number of preexpositions and iterations during the fMRI. Left hand side: pre-exposition; right hand side: fMRI session. An
additional category were originals (not displayed) that were shown 3, 6, or 9 times previously to the fMRI and in the identical version 9 times during
the fMRI.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036445.g001
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divergent version of the action (divergents, hereafter), which was
thereafter repeated. Lastly, we investigated the response to
constant violation of a model by unpredictable versions of the
according action movie (unpredictables, hereafter). This last manip-
ulation did not allow predicting the content of a model,
corresponding to a type of learning that is signified by a lot of
uncertainty.
We hypothesized that the hippocampal memory system should
be activated to a larger extend by associative novelty than novelty
per se and thus show more activity towards the unpredictable
movies and divergent movies than the novel movies. Moreover, in
line with the results reported by Strange and colleagues [18] we
expected the hippocampus to be responsive to the entropy that
resulted from repeated violations [18].
With regard to the striatal responses during learning, we focused
on a subdivision of the caudate nucleus that was previously
associated with perceptual prediction errors [41] and expected this
part of the striatum to be responsive to prediction errors but not to
respond to novelty. We therefore predicted that activity in this
caudate nucleus subdivision should decrease during repeated
presentation of the same divergent model. We also predicted that
this area should be activated more by the unpredictable movies
that entail an accumulation of prediction errors than by the
divergent movies. Lastly, with regard to the midbrain dopami-
nergic system, we predicted firstly, that the habenula would mirror
the caudate response. This prediction is derived from our own
data that has shown that the habenula mirrored caudate responses
towards prediction errors [41], a finding that extends the classical
view that this area is only activated towards prediction errors of a
negative valence. Secondly, we investigated exploratively whether
the substantia nigra, the dopaminergic input region to caudate and
hippocampus, would yield activity in line with one or both
structures, or would show a separate response pattern.
Materials and Methods
2.1 Subjects
19 right-handed, healthy participants (7 women, age 22–30
years; mean age 25.3 years) took part in the study. The
participants were right handed as assessed with the Edinburgh
Handedness Inventory [44]. The experiment was approved by the
local ethics committee of the University of Cologne and was in
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. All participants were
health screened by a physician and gave written informed consent.
2.2 Stimuli and Task
The stimulus material contained 37 different movies of 8 to
12 seconds length (mean 9.2 sec; standard deviation 1.39 sec).
The movies were shot from the third-person perspective, not
showing the actor’s face. They contained every-day actions taking
place at a table. Most movie scripts, e.g. making a sandwich,
existed in 2 versions (divergents). Some movie scripts existed in 6
different versions (unpredictables). All of these scripts had an identical
beginning, but started to diverge at some individual point,
whereafter no commonality existed (Figure 1). Each movie script
was filmed so many times, that the exact same shot of each script
occurred only once during the pre-experimental and the
experimental session. This method was employed to minimize
surface-similarities between the movies and avoid surface-refer-
ence perceptual priming.
The experiment consisted of a pre-experimental exposition of
most action movies and an fMRI session starting 15 minutes after
the end of the pre-exposition. During the pre-experimental
exposition session, participants were seated in a sound-attenuated
chamber facing a computer screen. Distance to the screen was
adjusted to ensure that the video displayed on the screen was
larger than 4u of visual angle, but did not extend 5u of visual angle
(depending on whether the participants moved their heads
slightly). The participants watched 27 scripts, a third of which
was displayed three times, another third six times and the last third
nine times, in a randomized fashion over the course of the
28 minutes lasting session. As mentioned above, the participants
watched one version of each script; but each repetition was
another shot of the same script (minimal distance between two
repetitions, or shots, of one script was 4 different scripts).
Questions concerning whether a specific action had occurred in
the immediately preceding script (e.g. ‘‘grasping an apple?’’) were
posed on average after every fifth script (minimum one movie,
maximum 11 movies between questions, standard deviation 2.1
movies) to ensure ongoing attention to the stimulus material.
Participants received visual feedback for 400 ms on whether they
had answered correctly, incorrectly, or too late. After pre-
exposition, participants were transferred directly to the fMRI
chamber.
2.3 FMRI session
36 different scripts appeared in the fMRI session. Each script
was repeated over the experiment. Nine scripts that had previously
been displayed during the pre-exposition were now displayed nine
times each in the same version (originals) as in the pre-exposition.
Another nine of the pre-experimentally shown scripts were
presented nine times in the fMRI session in different, but always
the same different version (divergents). Another nine scripts
appeared in five different versions during the fMRI. Each of these
different versions was displayed only once (unpredictables). One third
of all movies (including the originals, the divergents and the
unpredictables) had previously been displayed three times each,
another third six times each, and one third nine times each. The
design moreover encompassed three scripts that were repeated
nine times during the fMRI session and completely new to the
participants at first exposure (new originals, hereafter). Finally, there
were six single movies that were displayed only once and had not
been pre-exposed previously (singletons, hereafter) (Figure 1;
Table 1). The same type of question as in the pre-exposition
appeared during the fMRI, on average following every fifth movie.
Importantly, these questions did not draw attention to possible
differences between the versions of the movies (they were not
indicative of the fact that unpredictables or divergents existed or
whether the current movie belonged to either category). Apart
from the question trials, the design also encompassed null-events.
Null-events consisted of the display of the grey background screen
for 10 seconds. Immediately after the fMRI session, participants
filled in a questionnaire encompassing a free-recall task for the
movie scripts.
2.4 Data Acquisition
The functional imaging session took place in a 3T Siemens
Magnetom Trio scanner (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany). In a
separate session, prior to the functional MRI, high-resolution 3D
T-1 weighted whole-brain MDEFT sequences were recorded for
every participant (128 slices, field of view 256 mm, 256 by 256
pixel matrix, thickness 1 mm, spacing 0.25 mm).
The functional session engaged a single-shot gradient echo-
planar imaging (EPI) sequence sensitive to blood oxygen level
dependent (BOLD) contrast (28 slices, 4 mm thickness, 0.6 mm
spacing; in-plane resolution of 363 mm) parallel to the bicommi-
sural plane, echo time 30 ms, flip angle 90u; repetition time
Prediction Errors in Striatum and Hippocampus
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immediately, a set of T1-weighted 2D-FLASH images was
acquired for each participant (28 slices, field of view 200 mm,
128 by 128 pixel matrix, thickness 4 mm, spacing 0.6 mm, in-
plane resolution 3 by 3 mm).
2.5 FMRI Data Analysis
Functional data were offline motion-corrected using the
Siemens motion protocol PACE (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany).
Further processing was conducted with the LIPSIA software
package [45]. Cubic-spline interpolation was used to correct for
the temporal offset between the slices acquired in one scan. To
remove low-frequency signal changes and baseline drifts, a high-
pass filter was applied. The filter length was adapted to the rate of
occurrence of the rarest event and was different for the analyses
containing new originals compared to the other analyses. The filter
in the contrasts investigating only unpredictables and divergents was set
at 1/85 Hz. The (parametric) contrasts containing new originals
were high-pass filtered at 1/90 Hz. The matching parameters (6
degrees of freedom: 3 rotational, 3 translational) of the T1-
weighted 2D-FLASH data onto the individual 3D MDEFT
reference set were used to calculate the transformation matrices for
linear registration. These matrices were subsequently normalized
to the standardized Talairach brain size (x=135 mm,
y=175 mm, z=120 mm [46]) by linear scaling. The normalized
transformation matrices were then applied to the functional slices,
to transform them using trilinear interpolation and align them with
the 3D reference set in the stereotactic coordinate system. The
generated output had thus a spatial resolution of 3 by 3 by 3 mm.
A spatial Gaussian filter of 5 mm FWHM was applied.
The statistical evaluation was based on a least-square estimation
using the general linear model (GLM) for serially auto-correlated
observations [47]. Temporal Gaussian smoothing (4 seconds
FWHM) was applied to deal with temporal autocorrelation and
determine the degrees of freedom [47].
The design matrices were generated by hemodynamic modeling
using a d-function and its first derivate. The onset vectors in the
design matrices were modeled in a time-locked event-related
fashion and set to the point in time (hereupon ‘breach’) when the
movie (in the conditions divergents and unpredictables) differed from its
original pre-experimental exposition version. The originals and
new originals were modeled after the point in the movie that
would have been the breach, if they had been displayed in their
complementary version. This pseudo post-breach modeling was
employed for the originals and new originals, as all scripts were
counterbalanced in their assignment to conditions across partic-
ipants. Thus some participants could have encountered in the
function of divergent what to others was the original, or even new
original. We did this to ensure that the measured effects did not
stem from the identity of scripts or comparative length, but solely
their assigned condition in the experiment. The breach had
previously been visually timed to the moment when movement
trajectories revealed that either the manipulation or the reached-
for-object was different from that in the originals. The length of the
modeled events corresponded to the length of the script from the
breach to the end of the script (mean: 6.57 sec; STD: 1.78 sec).
2.5.1. Region of interest (ROI) definition
We used the 3D T1-weighted whole-brain scans of each
participant to individually segment four ROIs: left and right
caudate nucleus (Figure 2), the left and right hippocampus proper
(Figure 3), the left and right habenula, and the left and right
substantia nigra (Figure 4). The habenula, substantia nigra and
hippocampus ROIs were delimited according to anatomical
landmarks. The caudate ROI was created using the coordinates
of the peak voxels activated for violated predictions in a previous
study [41] and choosing a radius of 4 voxels. The resulting 3-D
area was then clipped in each brain individually to exclude the
internal capsule and ventricles. In 3 participants, clipping the
caudate ROIs to exclude the ventricles and internal capsule left
nothing of the caudate ROI remaining. These participants were
therefore excluded from the analysis.
The fMRI data analysis proceeded in two steps. In a first step,
we modeled each condition of interest (divergents, unpredictables and
new originals) parametrically. To that end, we generated three
separate design matrices, each containing three event types, two
times the movie type of interest and null-events. For example, the
design matrix for unpredictables contained as a first event type all
unpredictables with an amplitude vector of one. As a second event
type, it contained all unpredictables with an amplitude vector
corresponding to the specific script’s iteration in the fMRI session.
(The first iteration of one script was assigned an amplitude of five,
the second the amplitude of four, and so forth; this regressor will
Table 1. Overview of conditions and number of expositions.
Condition
No. of scripts that
appeared in the
respective condition
No. of preexpositions
for each script on the
condition
Iterations of the script in its
original or complementary
versions during fMRI
Repetitions of the
original (pre-fMRI
version) during fMRI
Repetitions of one
specific version
during fMRI
Originals 93 , 6 , o r 9 9 9 9
Divergents 93 , 6 , o r 9 9 - 9
Unpredictables 93 , 6 , o r 9 5 - 1
New Originals 3-9 - 9
Singletons 6-1 - 1
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036445.t001
Figure 2. Reconstructed, color-coded caudate ROIs in a 3-D
rendered brain.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036445.g002
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in the design matrix were null-events, assigned an amplitude of
one. The same set up applies to the design matrices for the linear
parametric attenuation modeling of divergents and new originals.I na
second step, we contrasted the unpredictables with the divergents and
the divergents with the new originals to investigate the relative and
persistent involvement of the hippocampus proper and the
striatum, i.e. caudate nucleus, in the processing of the different
movie types. Thus, the fourth design matrix contained as the first
event-type all unpredictables, each with a vector amplitude of one, as
the second event-type all divergents, with a vector amplitude of one
and lastly as a third event-type all null-events with a vector
amplitude of one. The fifth design matrix contained the event-
types divergents, new originals and null-events, all modeled with a
vector amplitude of one. The sixth analysis contrasted 12
randomly chosen unpredictables (each with an amplitude vector of
one) with the first presentation of the new originals and singletons
(with the same amplitude) and also contained null-events.
2.5.2. Modeling information theoretic quantities
We calculated the responses of all four bilateral ROIS to the
surprise (Figure 5) and the Shannon entropy (Figure 6) ascribed to
the content-development of the unpredictables. We assumed that the
brain should behave like an ideal observer and hence ascribe the
probability of an item according to:
p(xi)~
ni
jz1
P
k
nk
i z1
:
This model is in close keeping with the approach taken by Strange
and coworkers [18]. The probability (‘‘p’’) of the observation (‘‘x’’)
of a specific movie version (‘‘i’’) is calculated as the number of
times (‘‘n’’) the script has appeared in exactly that version (‘‘i’’) so
far (‘‘j’’) divided by the sum of appearances in all versions (‘‘k’’)
that have appeared so far (‘‘j’’). The addition of the value 1 shape a
Dirichlet distribution, that accords to an ideal observer. The
information theoretic quantities thus concern probabilities as they
are defined in a Bayesian framework.
Following previous approaches [17–19], surprise (‘‘I’’) at an
outcome (‘‘xi’’) was calculated as:
I(xi)~{lnp(xi):
This term, also known as the ‘negative evidence’ since surprise is
calculated as the negative logarithmic (‘‘2ln’’) probability (‘‘p(xi)’’)
of a specific movie version. It indicates the amount of information
that is conveyed by the observation [8].
Another important construct that describes the influence of
observations is Shannon entropy. Shannon entropy is again a term
derived from information theory [19] (but see [21]) and describes
the average surprise in a series of observations [17]. Shannon
entropy is therefore mathematically calculated as:
H(xi)~
X
i{k
{p(xi)|lnp(xi):
[17–18,21]. Entropy (‘‘H’’) at the observation (‘‘xi’’) is thus the
negative probability (‘‘-p(xi)’’) of the observation of a movie script
multiplied with its logarithmic probability (‘‘ln p(xi)’’), summed for
all versions (‘‘i-k’’) that are known to have occurred. (We employed
the natural logarithm, but binary approaches have been used (cf.
[18]). If all observations are equally likely and appear equally
often, each event is surprising, as it cannot be predicted [17]. This
is the setup of the highest Shannon entropy. If Shannon entropy is
large, each event is very informative [8,17,19].
Figure 3. Reconstructed, color-coded hippocampal ROIs in a 3-
D rendered brain.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036445.g003
Figure 4. Reconstructed, color-coded habenular (A) and nigral
(B) ROIs in a 3-D rendered brain.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036445.g004
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The second level analysis employed a permutation analysis to
correct for false-positives [48]. For all above-mentioned contrasts
or parametric analyses, we calculated 2000 different one-sample t
tests for each of the four ROIs. The important manipulation
consisted in a different reversal of experimental and control
condition in one to 16 subjects in all 2000 t tests. We thus
conducted a permutation of beta values, yielding different t-values
for each reversed assignment of the two conditions in the contrasts
on the subject level, as arbitrary relabeling of events is not
suggested for fMRI [48].
It can thus be determined, whether the analysis that agrees with
the experimental setup in all participants reaches a higher t-value
than randomly permuted analyses. This would then indicate, that
the activity revealed in the contrast is best accounted for by the
contrast between experimental and control condition and not due
to noise. The benefit of such a bootstrapping approach is that the t
tests do not assume a Gaussian distribution, but calculate the
distribution based on the variance in the data [48]. This is
important, as the use of a Gaussian distribution does not
necessarily fit activity in a spatially circumscribed ROI. The cut-
off t (tcrit) for significance testing was set at p=.05. This means that
Figure 5. Modelled BOLD for surpise over the iterations of unpredictables in the fMRI session. I3: surprise for the 3 times pre-exposed; I6:
surprise for the 6 times pre-exposed; I9: surprise for the 9 times pre-exposed unpredictables.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036445.g005
Figure 6. Modelled BOLD for entropy over the iterations of unpredictables in the fMRI session. H3: entropy for the 3 times pre-exposed;
H6: entropy for the 6 times pre-exposed; H9: entropy for the 9 times pre-exposed unpredictables.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036445.g006
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conditions must result in a lower t than the original experimental
assignment wherein the control condition is used as control
condition and the experimental condition used as experimental
condition for all 16 subjects.
2.5.4. Orthogonal model approach
In the analyses as laid out above, different design matrices were
used for each contrast, yielding maximum power to the specific
analysis. However since a number of analyses pertain to the same
events (unpredictables), but apply different models, we subdued the
fMRI data to additional analyses. These additional analyses made
use of a unified design matrix and orthogonalised the modeled
effects of entropy, surprise, and the linear parameter. To that end,
we generated one design-matrix as follows: The unpredictables
appeared in 4 event types. In the baseline entry, all amplitudes
were set to one. This was the first event type. For the second event
type, the amplitude vector was set corresponding to the item-
specific entropy. The third entry carried an amplitude vector
corresponding to surprise orthogonalised to entropy. The fourth
entry carried an amplitude vector according to the parameter
signifiying linear decrease, in a first step orthogonalised to entropy
and in a second step orthogonalised to surprise. The last entry of
this design matrix were null-events. The second-level permutation-
based analysis was the same as for the main contrasts (cf. 2.5.3).
2.6 Behavioral data analysis
After the fMRI session, participants were asked to recall as
many actions as they could remember. To test if the different
actions were differently well remembered depending on their
condition, these free recall rates were analyzed. Therefore, it was
counted how many movies of each condition were recalled by each
subject, which resulted in the absolute number of recalled divergents,
unpredictables, new originals, originals and singletons. Furthermore, it
was counted how often each of the recalled movies had been seen
during the experiment (during the pre-exposition and the
functional scanning). The number of expositions was aggregated
for each version of the movies, i.e. divergent movies have been
exposed 3+9, 6+9, or 9+9 times (pre-exposition+functional
scanning), whereas all new originals had been exposed 9 times
(during the functional scanning). To calculate the average number
of exposition of the recalled movies of one condition, the numbers
of expositions of the recalled movies were summed and then
divided by the number of the recalled movies. The inferential
analysis was performed in three steps:
At first, the influence of the exposition frequency was partialed
out by running a multiple regression with the sum of the recalled
actions (per condition) as dependent and the number of pre-
expositions as independent variables. The standardized residuals
of this analysis, i.e., the information that was not explained by
exposition frequency, served as dependent variable in the analysis
of the condition effect. To that end, a repeated-measures ANOVA
was calculated with the factor CONDITION (levels: originals, new
originals, divergents, unpredictables, singletons).
It must be borne in mind that all unpredictable versions of one
movie shared common actions in the common beginning of the
script. Moreover, the objects in different versions were sometimes
the same as in other versions, while the manipulation of the object
differed. For instance, all 6 different versions of one particular
movie (the pre-exposed version as well as the five unpredictable
versions during the fMRI) contained a piggy bank. Naming a
script from the unpredictables condition was therefore not necessarily
harder than naming a script from the originals, new originals or
divergents condition.
Results
1. Behavioral results
The behavioral analysis assessed how many actions were
recalled depending on the contingencies of the corresponding
action movie during the experiment, i.e., whether it was
completely new when encountered during the fMRI session (new
originals), whether it was displayed in a divergent version during the
fMRI compared to the preexposition (divergents), or whether it
displayed an altered version on each iteration during the fMRI
(unpredictables). The correlation between the sum of recalled actions
per condition and the exposition frequency was significant
(r=.458, p,.001). The repeated measures ANOVA on the
standardized residuals of the number of recalled actions and the
factor CONDITION yielded significance (F(2.81,50.54)=3.505, p=.024;
Greenhouse Geisser corrected for non-sphericity). On average, the
number of recalled actions in the condition divergents was higher
than for actions in the conditions new originals and unpredictables
(number of recall of divergents=2.26; new originals=0.47;
unpredictables=1.53). This difference was also visible in the
standardized residuals, which served as dependent variable in the
ANOVA (mean residual number of recalled divergents=0.530;
new originals=20.471; divergents=0.182).
2. ROI analyses
2.1. Contrast relating to acquisition. There was a
significant attenuation of activity with repeated exposures of the
new originals in the hippocampus (t=1.45; tcrit 5%=0.65; p,.05).
The substantia nigra showed attenuation of activity in the same
parametric contrast (t=2.00, tcrit 5%=1.56, p,.05). There was no
significant attenuation of activity in the caudate nucleus ROI.
The substantia nigra was the only structure that showed a main
effect for the processing of new originals vs. divergents. Thus, it was
significantly less activated by the processing of divergents compared
to new originals (t=21.225; tcrit 5%=21.225; p,.05).
2.2. Contrasts relating to adaptation. The hippocampal
ROI revealed a significant attenuation of activity with the repeated
exposure of divergents (t=0.88; t crit 5%=0.62; p,.05).
2.3. Contrasts relating to unpredictability. Processing of
the unpredictables activated the hippocampal ROI significantly
more than processing of new originals and singletons (t=1.65, tcrit
5%=1.60, p,0.05). In the caudate ROI there was more activity
for the processing of unpredictables at all stages than for the
processing of divergents (t=2.33; tcrit 5%=1.76, p,0.05). Likewise,
the habenula (t=2.58; tcrit 5%=1.79; p,0.05) and the substantia
nigra (t=2.45; tcrit 5%=1.56; p,0.05) were activated more by
unpredictables than by divergents. There was no attenuation with the
repeated exposure of unpredictables in any ROI at p,0.05.
A repeated measures ANOVA testing for main effects of CONDI-
TION (levels: new originals, divergents, unpredictables) on attenuation
effects in the hippocampal ROI. The repeated measures ANOVA
yielded a significant main effect of CONDITION. This effect was due to
significant differences between new originals and unpredictables. Since
the dependent variable reflected the slope of the attenuation, these
results indicate an interaction between the course of the ATTENUA-
TION and the CONDITION in the hippocampus.
2.4. Modeling information theoretic quantities. The
BOLD changes in the hippocampal ROI varied to a statistically
significant degree with the Shannon entropy of each observation of
an unpredictable (t=1.83; tcrit5%=1.59, p,0.05). Activity in the
caudate ROI for the modeling of surprise (as defined by
information theory) during the observation of unpredictables
approached significance at p=.054 (t=2.98;tcrit 5%=3.00;
tcrit 10%=2.73, p,0.1)
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ed replication of the former significant result for the hippocampus
ROI during the observation of unpredictables (t=1.83; tcrit
5%=1.50). Modeling surprise orthogonal to entropy yielded
significant activity in the caudate ROI during the observations
of unpredictables (t=3.24; tcrit 5%=2.73) exceeding the probability of
the marginal effect in the former analysis. No other ROI yielded
significant activity corresponding to entropy during the observa-
tion of unpredictables. No other ROI yielded significant activity
according to surprise orthogonalised to entropy during the
observation of unpredictables. No ROI yielded significant activity
for the modeling of a linear decrease orthogonalised to entropy
and surprise during the observation of unpredictables.
Discussion
Hippocampus, caudate nucleus and midbrain dopaminergic
system are supposed to contribute to learning and all of these
systems have been associated with learning from prediction errors.
But each structure’s specific contribution to learning in the
absence or from the presence of prediction errors deserves further
investigation. Here we used fMRI to tap these structures’ roles in
learning of observed action episodes. The hippocampal ROI
showed a decrease in activity as hypothesized during the
acquisition of a new model and the adaptation of an internal
model to a changed script. Thus, both adaptation processes are
signified by hippocampal decrease.
Interestingly, we found significantly higher activity for the
unpredictable violation of a known model than for complete
novelty, in line with the associative mismatch account [29]. Lastly,
the hippocampus showed an activity increase over the course of
unpredictables that reflects the Shannon entropy, or average surprise,
elicited by the prediction errors inherent in this condition
(Figure 6).
In contrast to the response pattern observed for the hippocam-
pal ROI, the caudate nucleus ROI was significantly more
activated by the processing of the prediction error profuse
unpredictables than by the processing of the eventually predictable
divergents. The caudate ROI also showed activity corresponding to
the surprise (Figure 5) entailed by the unpredictables.
Finally, as predicted, the habenula reflected the caudate
response to the occurrence of prediction errors in the unpredictables.
The substantia nigra displayed novelty responses, here with regard
to completely novel internal models.
Predictive Coding and the Hippocampus
The hippocampal activity accompanied the acquisition of a new
model and adaptation of an old model to change: Each
observation of the new originals and divergents led to a decrease in
hippocampal activity.
Activity decrease is understood to be a hallmark of learning (see
[49] for a recent review). Predictive or inferential accounts of brain
function explain why a decrease in activity can be regarded a sign
of learning [2,9,11,14]. To resurrect the picture, the brain builds
models of likely perceptions [11,14,50,51]. Sensory input is
predicted on the basis of these internal models. The model
effectively filters all anticipated information and thus modulates
cortical activity to represent only surprising, informative input
[2,11]. This activity, due to prediction errors, can either cause the
model to loose weight in predicting the sensory input (and thus
effectively being replaced by another model, cf. [20]), or induce
the change of the models’ predictions [10] pertaining to learning.
Decrease of neural activity over repeated iterations of a model is
therefore regarded as a sign of learning [51,52]. As the model gets
better, there are less prediction errors, causing less cortical activity.
The fact that the model gets more precise in predicting sensory
input, and therefore more and more of the signal, means it has
learnt.
Predictive coding is usually regarded to deal with current, not
anticipated sensory input [12,5]. However, viewing hippocampal
activity from a predictive coding perspective reveals how
predictions into the near future could be mediated. Combining
sensorimotor cortical responses as explained by predictive coding
[2,11] with models of hippocampal function [36,38] explains how
predictions of consecutive events can be established and matched
with sensory reality. Two functions of the hippocampus relate to
this account: first of all the hippocampus is regarded to store
compressed representations of cortical activity [24,52,53]. Sec-
ondly, it has the capability for coding sequential events [52,54–
56], for example in spatial navigation [23,29,34,57, but see 58]
and during learning of episodes [54,55]. These functions relate to
‘relational representation’ [55,56,59,60, but see 61], that means a
sparse coding of cortical patterns and their relation in time and
space. This coding for relation is achieved by small overlaps
between the sparse representations of the cortical patterns [62].
The underlying idea is that prediction of sequential events
[52,55] and spatial navigation [63] relies on the succession of
cortical patterns [64], coding for the (visual) input at a given time,
and the (visual) input that should come next. To predict the next
pattern in the sequence, the hippocampus can use the above-
mentioned minimal overlap between the cortical representations
to bind current activity to the activity pattern that is to follow. The
overlap between representations is strengthened by repeatedly
experiencing the sequence of cortical patterns [61,62]. Important-
ly, hippocampal representations can be back-projected to the
cortex, which forms the putative mechanism behind retrieval and
implicit learning [36]. The predictive coding account suggests that
cortical patterns are diminished once they are predicted. If one
cortical pattern that is part of a compressed sequential represen-
tation was elicited by unpredicted (e.g. visual) input, this would
lead to a retrieval of the stored representation (cf. pattern
completion, [29,38]) that predicts the next cortical pattern in the
sequence [29,64]. If this cortical pattern occurred, it would be
effectively filtered according to the predictive coding account [49].
This filtering results in less cortical activity and this smaller extent
of cortical activity may in turn cause comparatively less encoding
or weight change in the hippocampus, compared to a perception
that does not fit the predicted input; this account explains novelty
signals and especially signals reflecting the mismatch between
predictions and sensory input as unfiltered prediction errors.
We could show that long stimulus sequences, i.e., actions that
are new to the observer lead to a stepwise decrease in hippocampal
activity. We propose that the sequence of actions in the scripts
became predictable and the associated sequence of cortical
patterns resulted in a filtering of the sensory input. The decrease
in hippocampal activity can therefore be understood as a sign of an
increasingly valid model that predicts the course of the observed
action [49,50]. It is important to note that the predictions of
sensory input entailed conceptual predictions, as the different shots
of each script negated surface-similarities.
The associative mismatch account of hippocampal function [29]
in fact captures the same elements as predictive coding. It predicts
that anticipated input will result in lower activity than unpredicted
input. Moreover, Kumaran and Maguire [29] could show that
unpredicted input also elicits more activity than novel input. Thus,
not novelty, but the mismatch between expected and perceived
sequences activated the hippocampus [29]. This finding coined the
term of ‘‘associative mismatch detector’’ as a description of the
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notion in an important manner. The unpredictable courses of
known movies elicited more activity than completely new movies.
The finding that novel items (singletons and 1
st new originals) elicit less
activity than unpredictables that relate to a previous association can
also be recast in terms of predictive coding. As described
previously, predictive coding rests on Bayesian inference. That
is, the first of frequently paired items starts to predict the second
item with a high conditional probability. If this pairing is
consistent, the brain experiences little entropy and will therefore
not expect any deviations. A violation of this prediction results in a
higher activation than the encounter of an action movie that is not
encompassed in a recently acquired internal model, as in the case
of the first new originals and singletons. If no solid internal model
exists so far, the input will be filtered only to the degree that is
proposed by known action semantics. In comparison to the
episodic internal model trained for the unpredictables, the internal
model for the new originals does not ascribe a solid probability to
specific episodically acquired predictions. Thus, the mismatch
signal is smaller due to more lenient semantic predictions.
Entropy in the hippocampus
The current results suggest that the hippocampal activity reflects
Shannon entropy of the unpredictable courses (cf. [19]). Shannon
entropy measures the average surprise within a stimulus stream
[18]. In psychological terms we can therefore regard entropy as a
measure of uncertainty concerning predictions. While the respon-
siveness of the hippocampus to Shannon entropy replicates a result
by Strange and colleagues [18], it also expands our knowledge on
hippocampal function substantially. The experiment by Strange
and colleagues [18] dealt with learning of statistical regularities. It
did however not allow learning to predict the next item. On the
contrary, it was only possible to learn to predict the rate of
occurrence of items [18,65]. On the other hand, a related study by
Harrison and colleagues [65] investigated the involvement of the
hippocampus in learning the likelihood of a transition between two
successive items. These authors found no indication of hippocam-
pal coding for entropy [65]. In the current study the hippocampus
was sensitive to the entropy caused by unpredicted sequences of
actions, thus indicating that the hippocampus is sensitive to the
predictability of transitions in very complex stimuli, and without a
priori knowledge of all transitions or stimuli that will occur. This
latter fact seems to be relevant considering that Strange and
coworkers [18] have suggested that the hippocampus does not
encode the stimuli that violate predictions, but the fact that these
occur. The stimuli used by Strange and colleagues [18] were all a
priori known. Thus there was no need to encode their existence.
But these stimuli allowed acquiring an expectation of their
probability, which pertains to entropy. On the contrary, the
current study employed action movies and violations stemmed
from previously unassociated actions within the sequence. If these
actions had not been encoded, future violations and the entire
unpredictability could not have been detected. In fact, if the
content of violation had not been encoded at all, the responses
towards the unpredictables would have mirrored the responses
towards the divergents.
Having said that, it is interesting that the free recall rates for
divergents surpassed that for unpredictables, suggesting a less successful
encoding of the unpredictables. This finding may be not surprising,
given the fact that unpredictables did not possess the reliability to
enable future valid predictions. We thus find tentative evidence
that while stimulus sequences exposing high Shannon entropy are
encoded to a certain degree, the encoding is not as successful as
that for low-entropy or stable sequences. In similar vein, an
interesting study by Davis and colleagues [66] found that during a
category learning task, hippocampal BOLD activity was signifi-
cantly correlated to modeled entropy of the stimulus stream.
Those items that were later better remembered (exception to the
rule items) also significantly drive entropy in a stimulus stream.
Based on the results of the present study, we propose that the
hippocampus adapts its models of sequential sensory input as
implied by the associative mismatch account [29]. Moreover is the
hippocampus sensitive to the uncertainty under which it receives
information and encodes the uncertainty-eliciting input to a
specific degree.
The caudate nucleus in perceptual prediction errors
The caudate nucleus showed a higher response to unpredictables
than to divergents. Each unpredictable contained a breach of
expectation on the content level, that is the sequence of actions.
But only the first divergent contained a breach of expectation on the
content level while each subsequent divergent version of the same
movie repeated the same divergence compared to the original
script. On a higher level of description, each breach of expectation
of the unpredictables that occurred after the second iteration was fully
predictable as such, (albeit not predictable with regard to the post-
preach content). Caudate nucleus activity was therefore driven by
prediction errors on the content level, indicating a lack of meta-
learning. We could not establisha lineardecrease incaudateactivity
that would further argue in favor of a prediction error account, as it
would signify a decrease in activity as predictions become more
reliable. However, this null-findingcould alsobe dueto a non-linear
decrease over the iterations of divergents. Caudate signaling of
prediction errors is noteworthy in itself, as only few fMRI studies
have discussed the striatal involvement in not reward related
prediction errors [41–43]. The still dominant account for striatal
functioning is the temporal difference model that is usually associated
with reward related learning [3,31]. Only one recent study has
applied prediction errors in terms of predictive coding to striatal
function[42].The results ofthepresentstudysubstantiallyfosterthe
alternative, not reward related, understanding of striatal prediction
error signaling: the indication of prediction errors on a perceptual
level, irrespective the presence of reward or punishment [42] and
possibly associated with the amount of surprise that a prediction
error entails. On a related note, it is interesting that the habenula
mirrored the caudate activity. This result substantiates our previous
finding [41] of the habenula’s involvement in coding for perceptual
prediction errors. This result and its replication are highly
interesting, as it expands the generally finding that the habenula
codes for punishing or ‘‘worse than expected’’ outcomes [67]. In
close keeping with an argument put forward by Friston and
colleagues [68] prediction errors can concern the valence of an
outcome. However, the involvement of the habenula in perceptual
prediction errors could indicate that prediction errors as an
outcome of a predictive process can have a valence themselves,
possibly motivating the improvement of internal models.
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